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Subsidiary Decision-making under the Espoo Convention:  
Legal Status and Legitimacy 
 




A fundamental challenge in environmental law is designing institutions that 
can adequately respond to a highly variable and dynamic environment. The 
preferred approach in both domestic and international settings is to create 
regulatory tools that can respond to changing circumstances in both the physical 
and institutional environment.  This responsiveness is achieved in large measure 
through some form of administrative rule-making, whereby authority to interpret, 
elaborate and apply legal prescriptions is delegated to subsidiary bodies, which are 
able to craft context specific rules more efficiently. This efficiency does not, 
however, come without a cost. As decision-making authority is devolved to 
administrative actors, the links to legitimizing institutions such as legislatures and, 
in the international context, mechanisms of state consent, become more attenuated.  
In the context of international environmental law, the turn away from state consent, 
through the formal treaty process, as the sole source of rules raises important 
questions regarding the legal status of these subsidiary prescriptions. State consent, 
in addition to underlying the legality of international rules, also provides the chief 
source of legitimacy for those rules. Since multilateral environmental agreements 
rely upon subsidiary mechanisms that do not derive their legitimacy from state 
consent, greater attention ought to be paid to the legitimacy enhancing features of 
subsidiary rule-making processes.  
 
The focus of this paper is to consider the use of subsidiary decision-making 
mechanisms under the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact in a 
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Transboundary Context (the “Espoo Convention”). 1 This treaty, which was negotiated 
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN 
ECE) and signed in Espoo, Finland in 1991, imposes obligations on state parties to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) where the activities of the state 
(the state of origin) are likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact to 
the environment of another state party (the affected state). 2  The Convention 
prescribes the circumstances under which the obligation to conduct an EIA is 
triggered, the content of the EIA, and prescribes associated obligations to notify and 
engage in consultations with the affected state and the public within the affected 
state. The Espoo Convention itself is fairly concise, consisting of twenty articles and 
six appendices, but the parties have developed through regularly held Meetings of 
the Parties (MoP) a dense and complex constellation of mechanisms, guidelines, and 
interpretations to aid in the effective implementation of the treaty.  In this regard, 
the Espoo Convention has adopted the dynamic regime approach that has become 
the preferred model in international environmental law-making. 3 
 
The aim of this article is to describe the kinds of activities that subsidiary 
bodies are being called upon to perform under the Espoo Convention and the legal 
status of these normative developments.  We then draw out some of the practical 
implications of the use of subsidiary bodies in light of their legal status.  Our 
principal observation here is that the normative guidance provided by subsidiary 
bodies, in particular the Implementation Committee of the Meeting of the Parties, 
                                                     
1 The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 25 February 
1991, ILM, vol.30, 1991, 800 [hereinafter Espoo Convention]. The Convention entered into force on 
10 September 1997. There is an increasing body of literature on transboundary EIA; see, e.g., “the 
special issue on transboundary EIA”, 26 Impact Assessment and Project Assessment (IAPR) (2008); 
Theory and Practise of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (Bastmeijer Kees & 
Koivurova Timo eds., 2008); Neil Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment, 
Process, Substance and Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
2 For an overview of the negotiations, see Robert Connelly, “The UN Convention on EIA in a 
Transboundary Context: A Historical Perspective”, 19 Environmental Impact Assessment RevieW, 37 
(1999).  
3 Thomas Gehring, “International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems” (1990) 1 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law 35.  See also Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, 
“Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-
Noticed Phenomenon in International Law”, 94 American Journal of International Law (AJIL), 623 
(2000).   
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has developed a kind of twilight legal status; being both formally non-binding yet 
authoritative.4 In the final section of the paper, we consider more directly the 
manner by which the subsidiary bodies address the need for legitimacy and the 
critical role that these legitimacy-enhancing processes play in maintaining the 
efficacy of the Convention. In particular, we posit that if the continued vitality and 
robustness of the Espoo regime complex is to be maintained, careful attention must 
be paid to questions of accountability, procedural justice and the quality of 
justification provided by subsidiary bodies – considerations not unfamiliar to 
domestic administrative lawyers.  
 
The Espoo Regime Structure 
 
If we look to most domestic EIA systems, for instance those of Canada and the 
United States, we see that the actual legislative basis is often quite spare in its 
structure. The EIA provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the 
source of EIA rules for the U.S. federal government, consist of a few paragraphs, but 
a sprawling governance system has grown around the legislation, providing 
authoritative interpretations of ambiguous provisions, creating specialized rules 
and guidance to account for the various agencies involved, the types of projects 
assessed and the types of environmental problems encountered.5  So, for example, 
under NEPA there are some 70 separate regulations, 35 executive orders, and 25 
guidance documents that support the implementation of EIA within the U.S. federal 
government.  The Canadian system, in addition to the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (CEAA) itself, has 9 separate regulations, executive orders and 
cooperation agreements with different provinces; it also has engendered about 25 
different guidance documents, addressing matters such as public participation, 
                                                     
4 Schachter, “The Twilight Existence of Non-binding International Agreements” 71 AJIL (1977), 300; 
D. Zaring, “International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations”, 33 Texas International Law Journal (1998), 281. 
5 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC §§ 4321-4370(f). For a listing of related statutory 
instruments, see NEPAnet, online: http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/nepanet.htm (accessed: XX). 
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cumulative impacts, and scoping procedures.6  There is, in addition, a vast amount of 
judicial decisions that provide further authoritative guidance on the interpretation 
and application of EIA processes under both NEPA and CEAA.7   
 
It is worth recalling that the Canadian EIA system started as a stand-alone 
cabinet order.  Thus, both EIA systems evolved from fairly simple directives to very 
complex regulatory structures through their implementation. In order to 
understand why this evolution occurred, it is useful to consider the complexities 
involved in implementing EIA systems. At a principled level, the concept of EIA is 
quite straight forward – requiring proponents of planned activities to evaluate the 
environmental consequences of those activities where there is a potential for harm.  
However, it quickly became evident that more tightly prescribed rules regarding the 
exact kinds of activities that would necessarily be subject or exempt from EIA 
processes were desirable since EIA requirements otherwise cast their nets very 
widely.  As a result, domestic EIA systems have enacted regulations identifying 
activities or classes of activities that are automatically subject to, or exempt from, 
full EIA requirements.  Under NEPA, because of the diversity of federal agencies that 
are required to implement EIA requirements, these agencies have enacted their own 
EIA regulations to account for the specific activities and circumstances that engage 
that agency.  Because the constituent steps of the EIA process are ill defined in the 
base legislation, both courts and administrative bodies have sought to elaborate on 
the precise nature of the commitments to assess, notify and consult.  In the last 
fifteen years, emerging environmental issues such as climate change and biological 
diversity have required further guidance to those responsible for carrying out EIAs 
to promote adoption of best practices and consistency of implementation in relation 
to increasingly cumulative, interdependent and scientifically uncertain 
                                                     
6 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c.37.  For a listing of related statutory 
instruments, see Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, online: 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca(accessed: XX). 
7 The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality publishes annual surveys on NEPA litigation, see CEQ, 
online: http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/legal_corner/litigation.html.  For cases under CEAA, see Beverly 
Hobby and Garry Mancell, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act: An Annotated Guide, looseleaf 
(Canada Law Book: 1997). 
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environmental issues.  Specialized agencies have been created under both systems 
to oversee EIA processes and to continually develop and refine EIA practices. 
 
The Espoo Convention has undergone an analogous transformation, with the 
development of several treaty bodies that provide similar forms of guidance to the 
Parties.  The central decision-making body of the Convention is the Meeting of the 
Parties (MoP), which is the plenary organ of the Parties to the Convention.  The 
functions of the MoP are loosely prescribed by the Convention itself, with the central 
role of the MoP being the “continuous review of Implementation of the Convention” 
and includes a broad authority for the MoP to “[c]onsider and undertake any 
additional activities that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of 
this Convention”.8 The MoP has met five times since the Convention came into force 
in 1997 and has issued 43 decisions, the majority of which involve issues of 
implementation and compliance, including capacity building and amendments to the 
treaty. Decisions taken by the MoP are to be taken wherever possible on the basis of 
consensus, but the MoP rules of procedure allow decisions to be adopted by a 
3/4ths majority vote.9   
 
The Meeting of the Parties has also created a Working Group on EIA and an 
Implementation Committee that provide assistance and direction on 
implementation and compliance, including investigating and determining matters of 
non-compliance. Because the MoP only meets every three years,10 the subsidiary 
bodies provide continued direction to the Parties between meetings, addressing 
compliance issues as they arise and developing strategies for the improved 
functioning of the Convention.  The Working Group on EIA, in which all Parties are 
entitled to participate, manages the work plan for the Convention and provides a 
forum for the exchange of information and expertise on EIA, including the 
                                                     
8 Espoo Convention, Article 11.  
9 Rules of Procedure, Rule 37. Procedural decisions can be taken by a simple majority, see para. 2 of 
rule 37. MP.EIA/1998/1, 27 March 1998, at 
http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/1998/eia/mp.eia.1998.1.e.pdf (accessed: XX). 
10 The interval between the third and fourth meeting was four years. 
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development of guidelines and tools for capacity building.11  Unlike the Working 
Group on EIA, the Implementation Committee is constituted by a subset of the 
parties.12  Its eight members are elected by the Parties to serve up to two terms, 
each term being the period between Meetings of the Parties.  The bulk of the 
Implementation Committee’s workload relates to matters of compliance; both 
general compliance concerns (unrelated to a specific Party) and specific 
submissions made in relation to the possible non-compliance by a Party. Both 
subsidiary bodies are subject to the oversight of the Meeting of the Parties. The 
Convention also provides for an ad hoc Inquiry Commission under Article 3(7) that, 
in the event of a disagreement, provides advise on whether an activity is likely to 
have a significant transboundary environmental impact and thereby trigger 
obligations under the Convention. Much of the day-to-day administration of the 
Convention is supported by the Bureau and Secretariat. The Espoo regime nests 
within the overall environmental policy guidance institutions of the UN ECE. 
 
The creation of subsidiary bodies (to the MoP) is not explicitly recognized by 
the Espoo Convention, in contrast to the formal recognition of subsidiary bodies 
under other MEAs, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change13 and the Vienna Convention’s Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer.14  The authority to create subsidiary bodies does, 
however, fall within the very broad residual authority granted to the MoP to 
undertake any additional action required for the achievement of the purposes of the 
                                                     
11  The Working Group on EIA was established by the Meeting of the Parties in Decision 1/2. 
MP.EIA/1998/2, 27 March 1998. 
12 The Implementation Committee was established by the Meeting of the Parties in February 2001, 
Decision II/4, ECE/MP.EIA/4.  The current rules respecting the Implementation Committee’s 
structure are found in “Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee and Procedures 
for Review of Compliance” Appendix to MoP Decision III/2, ECE/MP.EIA/3. 
13 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed: XX).  
14 The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, see at 
http://www.unep.org/ozone/vc-text.shtml (accessed: XX) and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, at: 
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/treaty_text.php?treatyID=2 (accessed: XX)., See 
UNFCCC, Articles 9 and 10, creating the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, respectively; Montreal Protocol, Annex IV, Non-compliance 
Procedure, Article 5, establishing Implementation Committee. 
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Convention.15  Nevertheless, the Parties have also adopted an amendment to the 
Convention, not yet in force, providing for the establishment of subsidiary bodies.16   
 
The result is the transformation from a stand-alone treaty that is the sole 
source of normative commitments between the parties, to a regime whereby 
normative guidance is provided through a constellation of treaty and subsidiary 
bodies.  The development of treaty-based institutional frameworks can be seen as 
an alternative to the creation of formal international organizations, and responds to 
the need to develop ancillary rules for the implementation of complex regulatory 
activities. 17 One of the difficulties that institutional decision-making seeks to 
overcome is the time consuming and onerous requirements of creating formal legal 
obligations through treaties.18 As an example, the two amendments to the Espoo 
Convention unanimously adopted by the Meeting of the Parties remain not in force 
owing to the lack of ratifications by the Parties.19  
 
The development of treaty-based institutional frameworks is now widespread 
in multilateral environmental agreements and parallels the development of 
administrative procedures in domestic law. Indeed, the development of 
supplemental rules and processes under the Espoo Convention responds to similar 
demands seen in domestic EIA systems, such as adapting EIA practices to more 
complex activities, programmes and policies. It also accounts for the application of 
EIA processes across very different regulatory contexts, including highly divergent 
national systems and capabilities, incorporating emerging environmental issues and 
ensuring consistent application of the often ambiguous requirements. 
 
                                                     
15 Article 11(2)(f), the Espoo Convention.  
16 Second Amendment, Decision III/7, para. 3 (d), reads: “Establish such subsidiary bodies as they 
consider necessary for the implementation of this Convention”. See at: 
http://live.unece.org/env/eia/about/amendment2.html (accessed: XX). 
17 Ulfstein and Churchill make an argument that many of the MEA regimes can effectively be equated 
to inter-governmental organizations. Hence, the law applicable to inter-governmental organizations 
should also apply to MEA’s. See Churchill and Ulfstein, supra note 3 
18 See Geoffrey Palmer, “New Ways to Make International Environmental Law” (1992) 86 AJIL 259. 
19 The status of ratification of amendments is listed on the Convention website, supra n.16. 
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2. The Legal Status of Subsidiary Body Rulings 
 
Because the decisions of treaty bodies do not follow the formal requirements 
for the creation of binding legal obligations, the legal character of decisions is 
ambiguous.  As a matter of formal international law, decisions of the Meeting of the 
Parties can be legally binding where there are specific treaty provisions setting out 
the conditions under which the Meeting of the Parties may bind members. For 
example, the Montreal Protocol provides clear authority for the Meeting of the 
Parties to make binding decisions respecting adjustments to control measures for 
ozone depleting substances.20 The Espoo Convention contains no such express 
provisions; consequently any power that the MoP has to bind Parties must be 
implied or read into the very broad powers of Article 11. The MoP and the 
Implementation Committee have not clearly commented on the nature of MoP 
decisions. The Implementation Committee suggested in 2003 that MoP decisions are 
not binding, but, as outlined below, it later indicated that MoP decisions could be the 
subject of compliance review.21 Notwithstanding their uncertain formal legal status, 
the decisions of the MoP and the Implementation Committee often are intended to 
have authoritative value, insofar as the treaty bodies identify preferred 
interpretations of treaty provisions, impose duties on parties and determine the 
rights of third parties.   
 
For example, at the Fifth MoP, the Parties issued a decision respecting the 
interpretation of Article 14 of the Convention addressing the requirements for entry 
into force of amendments to the Convention along the lines prescribed by the 
amendment. 22  The Article in question requires that an amendment to the 
                                                     
20 Montreal Protocol, Article 2(9). 
21 Original Implementation Committee statement found in MP.EIA/WG.1/2003/3, para. 10.  
Subsequent MoP decision, Decision IV/1, para. 8. 
22  Fifth Meeting of the Parties, Geneva, June 20-23, 2011, Decision V/2. Decision V(2) provides that 
“Noting  that article 14, paragraph 4, of the Convention, which establishes the conditions for entry 
into force of amendments to the Convention other than those to an annex, is open to different 
interpretations due to the ambiguity inherent in the expression “by at least three fourths of these 
Parties”, Recalling that the second amendment to the Convention replaces the above-cited expression 
with “by at least three fourths of the number of Parties at the time of their adoption”, Recalling also 
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Convention adopted by the Parties shall enter into force upon the “ratification, 
approval or acceptance by at least three fourths of these Parties”.23  The phrase “by 
at least three fourths of these Parties” gives rise to some ambiguity as it is not clear 
whether the number of Parties to be considered should include only those Parties 
that were party to the Convention at the time of adoption of the amendment or 
three fourths of the current number of Parties.  The ambiguity is of practical 
consideration as the latter interpretation raises the number of ratifications required 
from 24 to 33 in the case of the first amendment and from 30 to 33 in the case of the 
second amendment. This ambiguity is itself the subject of the second amendment 
whereby the Parties agreed to replace the above-cited wording with the phrase, “by 
at least three fourths of the number of Parties at the time of their adoption”.24  The 
fact that the Parties adopted an amendment, even if of a clarifying nature, suggests 
that the matter could not be addressed through the MoP alone.25 The interpretation 
would have the effect of altering (or clarifying) when amendments to the 
Convention come into force, and is clearly intended to be determinative of the 
matter.  
 
A parallel example arises in relation to the obligation of the Parties to report 
on compliance matters.  This obligation is also the subject of an adopted, but not in 
force, amendment to the Convention, which provides that the Meeting of the Parties 
may decide on the frequency of reporting required and the information to be 
provided. Notwithstanding, the absence of a formal legal obligation to report, the 
                                                                                                                                                            
article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which sets out general rules on the 
interpretation of treaties and which requires, in paragraph 3 (a), that any subsequent agreement 
between the parties to a treaty regarding its interpretation or the application of its provisions shall 
be taken into account…[d]esiring to bring about an early entry into force of the amendments adopted 
through its decisions II/14 and III/7,  1.   Agrees to interpret the expression “by at least three fourths 
of these Parties” as meaning at least three fourths of the Parties to the Convention that were Parties 
at the time of the adoption of the amendment in question; 2.   Decides that any State that becomes a 
Party to the Convention after the date of adoption of this decision is also deemed to have agreed to 
the interpretation of article 14, paragraph 4, of the Convention set out above.  
23 Espoo Convention, Article 14. 
24 Decision III/7. 
25 The amendment was suggested by a sub-group of the Working Group on EIA. The justification for 
the amendment was to bring the wording in line with the wording used in the subsequently adopted 
Strategic Environmental Assessment Protocol, See “Working Group on Environmental Impact 
Assessment, Sixth Meeting”, October 27-29, 2003, MP.EIA/WG.1/2003/10. 
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Implementation Committee and the Meeting of the Parties subsequently decided 
that a failure to report on implementation might be a compliance matter to be 
decided by the Implementation Committee.  From the Implementation Committee’s 
perspective, the adoption of the amendment indicated an intention by the Parties to 
be subject to reporting obligations, which in turn gives rise to question of non-
compliance if these obligations are not met.26  The position of the Implementation 
Committee was supported by a subsequent decision of the Meeting of the Parties, 
which required the Parties to complete a reporting questionnaire, and noted that a 
failure to do so might be subject to collective scrutiny through the Implementation 
Committee.27 
 
This second example differs from providing an authoritative interpretation 
since in the first example the rule has its foundation in the treaty. Here there is no 
textual basis to support a duty to report on implementation, rather the obligation is 
wholly a product of the MoP. The Implementation Committee does not directly 
address the legal status the MoP decisions enjoy. However, by maintaining that the 
requirements are subject to collective scrutiny through the Implementation 
Committee the rules are given a hard edge. There is nothing inherently 
contradictory in subjecting formally non-binding rules to non-compliance processes. 
The Implementation Committee’s mandate is “non-adversarial and assistance-
oriented” and they have limited powers to recommend penalties for non-compliance 
and only in exceptional circumstances.28 In this context, requiring information 
regarding implementation simply allows the Implementation Committee to fulfill its 
mandate, which may be compromised if Parties are not required to provide 
information regarding their activities.  This is particularly important in relation to 
                                                     
26 MP.EIA/WG.1/2005/3. 
27 Decision IV/1. 
28 According to Rule 12 (d and e) of the Operating Rules of the Committee, the Committee may 
recommend to the MoP for it to issue a declaration of non-compliance but, in exceptional 
circumstances, even “to suspend, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law 
concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, the special rights and privileges accorded to 
the Party concerned under the Convention. ECE/MP.EIA/10, at: 
http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/ImplementationCommittee/IC_operating
rules_en.pdf  (accessed: XX).  
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transboundary EIA activities, which are implemented through domestic EIA and 
difficult to monitor externally. 
 
Decisions and rule-making by the MoP maintain strong democratic credentials 
because of the MoP’s plenary and consensus driven nature.  Greater concerns may 
arise in relation to the decisions of the Implementation Committee given its much 
smaller composition.  As noted, the decisions of the Implementation Committee are 
subject to the oversight of the MoP, but the Committee operates with significant 
autonomy in many of its functions.  For example, in their deliberations regarding the 
Ukraine’s non-compliance with certain provisions of the treaty in relation to the 
Bystroe Canal, the Implementation Committee was required to consider the legal 
implications of an Inquiry Commission determination of a likelihood of significant 
transboundary environmental impact.29 Under the Espoo Convention, an Inquiry 
Commission, which is an ad hoc body composed of three experts, can be convened at 
the request of a Party, where there is a disagreement about whether a planned 
activity is likely to have a significant adverse transboundary impact, and thereby 
triggering the application of further obligations under the Convention. Article 3(7) 
of the Convention describes the role of the Inquiry Commission to provide “advice”, 
on the likelihood of a significant impact.  The wording suggests that the findings of 
an Inquiry Commission are not determinative, but recommendations to the Parties, 
although there is some ambiguity. The Implementation Committee, however, 
expressed the view that: 
 
The final opinion of an inquiry commission is a matter of fact and takes 
effect immediately; in particular the Convention does not provide for the 
Parties to ‘study’ such an opinion…The final opinion of an inquiry 
commission cannot be challenged and should lead to notification if the 
opinion is that a significant adverse transboundary impact is likely; and that 
                                                     
29 See the evolvement of the Bystroe Canal case, at: 
http://live.unece.org/env/eia/implementation/inquiry.html (accessed: XX). 
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the source state must immediately suspend implementation of the project in 
question.30 
 
This decision of the Implementation Committee is far reaching not only 
because it impacts the substantive rights of the source state so directly and without 
recourse, but also because the interpretation will influence the rights of future 
parties in relation to Inquiry Commission.  In this case, the interpretation of the legal 
significance of the Inquiry Commission’s advice led quite directly to a finding of non-
compliance by the Implementation Committee.31  In providing this opinion, the 
Implementation Committee approached the interpretive task in much the same way 
as a court, citing legal principles such as the prevention principle in support of their 
decision.32   
 
It is, of course, a natural consequence of the Implementation Committee’s 
mandate that it be required to interpret and elaborate upon the Convention’s 
requirements. In exercising its authority, the Implementation Committee decisions 
are beginning to take on a quasi-judicial form: the Committee provides reasoned 
justifications for its decisions, references international law, and relies on guidance 
documents in support of its interpretations. The Implementation Committee 
demonstrates an awareness of the need for objectivity and avoidance of bias 
through rules requiring members to excuse themselves of decisions affecting their 
own state. Most recently, the Implementation Committee collated and published its 
previous opinions on matters related to the Convention, suggesting a clear desire for 
adherence to its past decisions; they are in effect a form of precedent. In considering 
the “Opinions of the Implementation Committee” at its fifth Meeting the MoP 
“urged” the Parties to take the opinions into account, suggesting their strong 
                                                     
30 MOP Decision IV/2, annex 1, para 43, 53. 
31 Findings and Recommendation further to a submission by Romania regarding Ukraine, 
ECE/MP.EIA/2008/6. 
32 Para 53, infra note 31. 
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interpretive value.33  In its consideration of the Implementation Committee’s report 
on its activities, the MoP goes further and specifically adopts a number of the 
Implementation Committee’s interpretive positions (including its position on the 
status of Inquiry Commission advice, discussed above) as its own.34  (The MoP uses 
the term “considers” to indicate that the view of the Implementation Committee is 
the view of the MoP.) 
 
The Implementation Committee also exercises important authority to 
determine its own processes, subject again to MoP oversight, and can have 
important consequences for the future development of the Convention. At an early 
meeting of the Implementation Committee, the Committee was asked to consider a 
non-compliance issue that was brought to the attention of the Implementation 
Committee by an NGO, not a Party.  The Committee’s mandate did not clearly specify 
whether it should consider non-compliance issues initiated by the public. It is 
noteworthy that the Convention itself requires Parties to notify the public in the 
affected state where a proposed activity may have a significant adverse 
transboundary impact and requires the Parties to provide a mechanism whereby 
the public can provide its comments on proposed activities.35 In this manner, the 
Convention indirectly confers rights on the public of affected states by specifying the 
obligations to notify and consult affected persons. The Aarhus Convention, which 
similarly confers rights of public participation, does allow the public to raise non-
compliance issues directly.36  However, a majority of the Committee members were 
of the view that extending these rights to the public in the case of the Espoo 
Convention exceeded the Implementation Committee’s mandate.37 The MoP has 
                                                     
33 Opinions of the Implementation Committee, 2001–2010, ECE/MP.EIA/2011/6, at 
http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2011/eia/ece.mp.eia.2011.6.e.pdf (accessed: 
XX).  
34 Decision V/4. 
35 Articles 3(1) and 3(8), the Espoo Convention. 
36 Paragraphs 18 to 24, Annex to Decision I/7, MoP Aarhus Convention 
37 Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, para.7, 
ECE/MP.EIOA/WG.1/2004/4. For an analysis, see T. Koivurova, “The Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context" in Making Treaties Work (edited by Ulfstein, G. in 
collaboration with Marauhn, T., and Zimmermann, A.), Cambridge University Press (2007), 218-239.. 
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subsequently taken a less rigid view of the ability of non-Parties to initiate 
compliance proceedings. In the Operating rules for the Implementation Committee, 
the MoP decided not to limit initiatives with reference to the source of the 
information regarding non-compliance, but with regard to the nature and quality of 
the information provided.38  
 
Before turning to the question of legitimacy, several observations regarding 
the nature and legality of treaty body decisions may be useful.  First, there is no 
debate regarding the ability of the Implementation Committee to create formally 
binding rules.  It cannot.  However, the Implementation Committee is very clearly an 
important source of normative guidance and has considerable discretion to 
interpret and apply the Convention within the direction of the MoP. The 
‘judicialization’ of the Implementation Committee shifts the function of the 
Implementation Committee towards a more autonomous role, whose authority is 
linked to its adherence to fair process and reasoned decision-making. The 
publication of prior ‘opinions’ with the express hope that they guide future decision-
making and Party behavior demonstrates the self-conscious embracing of this role. 
 
The legal status of MoP decisions is less straightforward. But given the MoP’s 
superior status within the Convention structure, it is evident to us that the 
Implementation Committee is bound by the decisions of the MoP.39  Thus, the 
                                                     
38 Rule 15 states: 
1. The sources of information by which the Committee might become aware of a possible non-
compliance could be: 
(a) Parties’ work under the Convention; (b) Any other source. 
2. In determining whether to begin a Committee initiative, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the 
appendix to decision III/2, the Committee should take into account, inter alia, the following: 
(a) The source of the information is known and not anonymous; 
(b) The information relates to an activity listed in Appendix I to the Convention likely to have a 
significant adverse transboundary impact; 
(c) The information is the basis for a profound suspicion of non-compliance; (d) The 
information relates to the implementation of Convention provisions; (e) Committee time and 
resources are available, see at: 
http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/ImplementationCommittee/IC_operating
rules_en.pdf (accessed: XX). 
39 See Geir Ulfstein, “Treaty Bodies” in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey, eds.), Oxford University Press (2007), 877 at 881. 
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Implementation Committee is bound to follow both procedural directions from the 
MoP and must adhere to interpretive positions taken by the MoP. In our view, the 
Implementation Committee’s suggestion that decisions of the MoP are not binding is 
incorrect and is likely dependent upon the content of the decision.  Ulfstein and 
Churchill have suggested that treaty bodies, like international organizations, possess 
implied powers that are necessary to carry out their express purposes.40 Resort to a 
doctrine of implied powers is not strictly necessary under the Espoo Convention, 
since the Convention confers broad powers on the MoP to take necessary actions in 
furtherance of the Convention’s purposes.41 This is not an open-ended authority, but 
would reasonably include the authority to determine matters of internal 
administration and exclude the imposition of substantive obligations, which would 
require an amendment to the Convention. The reporting obligation falls somewhere 
in between these poles and for this reason the MoP has hedged its position by 
adopting an amendment to the Convention, but also indicating it considers the 
requirement mandatory (notwithstanding that the amendment is not in force).   
 
The MoP’s interpretive function is supported by its institutional position. As 
the principal treaty organ responsible for implementing the Convention, it is 
institutionally required to interpret the Convention. It is fair to attribute to the 
Parties the interpretive practices of the MoP, particularly where they are arrived at 
by consensus. In this circumstance, it would seem that MoP decisions can be 
considered “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” per Article 
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, particularly where those interpretive practices 
become embedded in the activities of the treaty bodies.42 There is an inevitable line 
                                                     
40 Supra n. 3 
41 Article 11(2)(f), the Espoo Convention. 
42 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is widely seen as representing 
customary law of treaties, at:  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (accessed: XX). See 
decision V (2) of the meeting of the parties where the MoP explicitly stated that its decision should be 
viewed in light of “… article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which sets out 
general rules on the interpretation of treaties and which requires, in paragraph 3 (a), that any 
subsequent agreement between the parties to a treaty regarding its interpretation or the application 
of its provisions shall be taken into account”, supra note 20.   
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drawing exercise between interpretation of the Convention and making 
amendments to it. Matters subject to amendment are explicitly subject to formal 
ratification requirements. The distinction is, of course, imprecise, and blurred by the 





There is a strong functionalist approach that is apparent in the MoP’s activities 
where legal formality is subordinated to effectiveness concerns.  This is most 
evident in the interpretation of the effect of Inquiry Commission “advice”. Had the 
Implementation Committee and, subsequently, the MoP, maintained that the Inquiry 
Commission’s determination of significant adverse transboundary impact was 
recommendatory in nature, the effectiveness of the Espoo Convention would have 
been undermined. A fundamental advantage held by the Espoo Convention over 
other international rules regarding EIA is the availability of a mandatory process to 
determine whether an impact is significant and thereby triggers other obligations. 
Outside of the Espoo Convention, where this mechanism is not available, the 
determination of significant impact has led to a number of international disputes.43 
In order to ensure that the Espoo Convention would be applied with greater 
certainty and to prevent recalcitrant Parties from refusing to accept the Inquiry 
Committee’s advice, the Parties opted for a functional, not literal, interpretation of 
the Committee’s powers.  This same preference for functionalism can be seen in the 
Implementation Committee and MoP’s approach to compliance with reporting 
requirements and determining the rights of third parties to initiate compliance 
proceedings. 
 
The authoritativeness of the Implementation Committee and MoP’s decisions comes 
not from its formal legal nature, but from its attention to principles of 
                                                     
43 See Alan Boyle, this issue.  See also Craik, supra n.1 at 111 -120, describing interstate EIA disputes. 
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accountability, procedural justice and the quality of the justification given. The move 
away from state consent as the principal criteria for binding states and the 
consequent normative ambiguity requires an explanation of compliance rooted in 
legitimacy not legality.44  Here we can identify four distinct strategies employed by 
the treaty bodies to enhance their legitimacy.45 
 
Consensus driven decision-making within the MoP ensures a level of consent from 
state representatives, and while not adhering to the formal requirements of 
international law-making it provides clear lines of democratic accountability. Some 
care should be taken not to equate consensus decision-making by the MoP with 
formal state consent, as the former does not adequately penetrate the democratic 
institutions of the state itself.  From a compliance standpoint states will be loath to 
not comply with MoP decisions in which they have participated.  The accountability 
of the Implementation Committee is similarly addressed through MoP oversight. 
 
Second, conformity with norms of procedural fairness, such as transparency and 
participation, further promote the legitimacy of the treaty bodies’ outcomes. The 
Implementation Committee’s Operating Rules provide a set of procedural rules 
covering matters such as notification, and participation of Parties whose compliance 
is subject to review, including opportunities to make representations respecting 
draft findings, conflicts of interest, confidentiality and the publication of 
documentation.46 The importance of these rules is to promote the acceptance of 
outcomes by requiring adherence to fair procedures.   
 
                                                     
44 For an account of compliance that focus on the role of legitimacy see Jutta Brunnee and Stephen 
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
45 The concept of legitimacy is subject to multiple meanings.  Here we refer to normative legitimacy 
in that we are identifying those attributes of the treaty bodies which ought to lead to acceptance by 
Parties and other actors of the authoritativeness of decisions by Espoo Convention treaty bodies.  For 
a discussion of the concept of legitimacy in international environmental law, see Daniel Bodansky, 
“Legitimacy” in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Bodansky, Brunnee and 
Hey, eds., (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 704. 
46 Operating Rules, Annex to Decision IV/2. 
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A third, and related, approach to legitimacy is the adoption of judicialized forms of 
decision-making. We note the attention to neutrality, transparency and 
opportunities for affected Parties to make representations, but also in the 
substantive form of the decisions themselves, which are justified in light of 
principles of international law and guidance documents generated by the MoP.47 
Importantly, the Implementation Committee is emerging as both a source and an 
arbiter of these rules as it publicizes its prior opinions, which themselves are 
intended to have normative value. 
 
Finally, substantive legitimacy is enhanced through the MoP’s focus on improving 
the effectiveness of the Convention; that is, the ability of the Convention to achieve 
its purposes. In dynamic environments, formality and rigidity may undermine the 
effectiveness of international rules, as contexts evolve or unforeseen circumstances 
arise. The ability of the MoP to overcome the constraints of formal international 
law-making in order to achieve collectively sought ends, promotes the acceptance of 
the MoP’s authority.48 
 
We would posit that the means of promoting legitimacy are not only directed 
towards Parties, but to other actors as well. The transnational nature of the Espoo 
Convention means that the decisions of the treaty bodies not only affect the State 
Parties, but also non-state actors impacted by transboundary environmental 
impacts. In this regard, state participation in MoP decisions alone may be 
insufficient to generate legitimacy among members of the participating state’s 
public, which may not share the same interests as the state itself. However, by 
ensuring that its processes are open and adhere to accepted procedural and 
substantive norms, treaty bodies can enhance their standing beyond the state. 
                                                     
47 For instance, the implementation committee provides in its synthesis 2001-2010 report (para. 22) 
that: “The immediate suspension of implementation [as a result of a request for establishment of an 
inquiry commission] can … be invoked from the objective and purpose of the Convention. As set out 
in the preamble and in article 2, paragraph 1, the Convention is based on the principle of prevention, 
which is well embedded into international environmental law”, see supra note 30. 
48 See Daniel Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Common Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?” 93 AJIL (1999), 596, describing substantive legitimacy. 




There is a relationship between the evolution of the Espoo Convention from being a 
static source of rules towards becoming a more dynamic regime and the increased 
emphasis on legitimacy, as opposed to legality. Instead of relying on state consent, 
which is external to the Convention, the regime is able to generate legitimacy from 
within, as the Parties create new or refined norms through mechanisms that are 
internal to the Convention structure. In this regard, the various sources of 
legitimacy we identify above operate in a complementary and overlapping fashion. 
For example, the compliance functions of the Implementation Committee provide an 
opportunity for the Parties to collective examine the application of treaty rules and 
procedures and to refine those rules in light of this information by formulating new 
interpretations or creating new processes. We posit that this structure provides a 
resiliency to the regime, as it allows for change through multiple avenues (for 
example, through Convention amendments and parallel MoP decisions) and 
provides multiple sources of system authority. Formal legality is not rendered 
irrelevant, but it becomes one strand in a more complex system of normative 
guidance. 
 
 4. Conclusion  
 
The pattern that emerges from the law-making activities of the Convention 
treaty bodies is one where formal legality loses its primacy as the Parties privilege 
regime effectiveness over the need for formal state consent. Decisions from treaty 
bodies can often have an ambiguous legal status – but the Parties collectively 
recognize the value of maintaining high expectations of compliance with the 
decisions of treaty bodies. Compliance becomes self-propagating – as parties treat 
decisions of the meeting of the parties and the Implementation Committee having 
authoritative value. Authoritativeness in this context does not emerge automatically, 
but as a result of the Parties’ careful attention to legitimacy. 
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Why does this require our attention? While compliance has not been a serious 
issue with the Espoo Convention, the same questions that are confronting other 
multilateral environmental regimes are likely to arise in the future regarding why 
states ought to comply with Espoo regime prescriptions that are not clearly formally 
binding. Providing a satisfactory answer to this question contributes to the robust 
nature of the Convention as it moves forward.  The absence of the formal criteria of 
legality requires in our view a different theory of compliance based on legitimacy 
not legality.  Decisions ought to be complied with to the extent that the decision-
makers pay careful attention to accountability, right process and can offer reasons 
for their decision which adhere to accepted substantive norms and values.  The 
requirement for accountability suggests that the Parties ought to take seriously the 
supervisory role of the Meeting of the Parties, in particular in view of the various 
normative functions the Implementation Committee plays. This would appear to be 
the case, as demonstrated by the MoP’s decision to admit the possibility of a non-
Party initiated compliance question after the Implementation Committee had held 
otherwise. 
 
Over the last twenty years we have seen an evolution of the Espoo Convention 
from a stand-alone treaty to a more complex regime and this evolution has been 
accompanied more recently by a shift from treaty compliance to regime compliance. 
That shift has necessitated a blurring of the line between implementation and law-
making – which results in a tension between the desire for efficacy, on the one hand, 
and the need for state consent, on the other. This tension, however, can be 
successfully mediated with careful attention to concepts of administrative 
legitimacy. 
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